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In 2011 China initiated policies to promote the adoption of solar photovoltaic (PV) using feed-in tariff
(FIT) policies. Since then the PV domestic market expanded substantially. In the past six years, the FIT
policies were updated (adjustment of tariff levels, division of three FIT regions, setting of installation quo-
tas) to address emerging problems such as PV waste, explosive installation, unbalanced spatial distribu-
tion. This paper aims to investigate the historical development and implementation of FIT policies in
China from 2011 to 2016. The tools of net present value (NPV)/internal rate of return (IRR), learning curve
and the system dynamics are employed to show the degree of economic incentives of FIT policies, to
understand the learning rate of centralized PV systems, and to study the dynamic mechanism of the
FIT system. We conclude that in the near term the tariff levels should be adjusted more frequently to keep
IRR values in the range of 8–12%, and a tight quota combined with the deployment of ultra-high voltage
(UHV) lines should be continued for the provinces with severe PV waste.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The Chinese government set as a target that by the end of 2020
non-fossil energy should account for at least 15% of national pri-
mary energy consumption [1]. The motivations behind this target
include dealing with climate change and other environmental
problems, improving competitiveness in the field of new energy
technologies and promoting national energy security. Solar photo-
voltaic (PV) is a promising technology to meet that goal.
In China, policies for solar PV were started in 1990s [2]. In the
early stage, the China’s PV policies mainly focused on R&D
(research and development) and product popularization and appli-
cation stage [3,4]. The central authority invested in R&D mostly
through 863 Programs, 973 Programs and Key Technologies R&D
programs [5]. As Lei et al. [6] pointed out that investment in ChinaPV was mainly focused on manufacturing and application, insuffi-
cient in R&D. Because of technology transfer from western coun-
tries to China, large European market and low resource costs
(labor, land and material resources), China’s PV industrial activities
started to replace western production capacity [7]. Since 2007 the
production of Chinese PV cell has topped the world [3]. However,
the development of domestic PV market was really slow, only
140 MW of cumulative installation in 2008 [4]. After 2008, the
policies were gradually transferring from supply-side policies to
demand-side policies to expand domestic market. In 2009, the cen-
tral authority initiated the Solar Roofs Program and the Golden Sun
Demonstration Program and by 2012 these two programs sup-
ported a total capacity of 3423.2 MW [5]. The central authority also
sponsored two rounds of public tender for solar power projects in
2009 and 2010 with a total capacity of 290 MW, which aimed to
test the benchmark price of domestic PV power generation [8].
Those programs promoted the domestic adoption of PV technol-
ogy. In July, 2011, in order to deal with the severe manufacturing
capacity surplus and the deteriorating international market, China
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era in the development of solar PV. FIT policies are instruments
designed to attract investment in solar PV generation by offering
long-term guaranteed purchase prices to generators for selling
their electricity to the grid. With the stimulus of long term guaran-
teed tariffs, the domestic market expanded rapidly, reached a total
of 77 GW cumulative installation in 2016 [9]. Today China is a
dominant global player in the PV supply chain, including manufac-
turing of silicon, ingot, wafer, cells and modules [10].
In China, the development of solar PV has experienced two
phases. In the initial phase (2011–2013) the domestic PV market
was suddenly stimulated by the FIT policies. However, most
capacities were installed in the western area of highest resource
endowment. In the second phase (2014–2016), the rapid expan-
sion continued, but combined with serious waste of PV electricity
(see PV waste rate in Table A.5). The PV waste was mainly because
most PV power generations located in the less developed western
area and no long-distance transmission line existed to connect the
solar resource centers to the consumption centers in the central
and eastern provinces. In this phase, the FIT polices were updated
by setting three FIT regions to encourage investments in the east-
ern and central China. The quota instrument was introduced to
control the PV waste in the western China. Therefore tariffs and
quotas worked together to contribute to a balanced spacial deploy-
ment, to control PV waste and to contain policy cost. Fig. 1 shows
the annual new installation of centralized and distributed power
generations. As in China most PV power generations come from
centralized systems, our study mainly focus on centralized PV
power generations which usually have a capacity of at least
20 MW.
This paper aims to investigate the historical development and
implementation of FIT policies in China from 2011 to 2016. We
study the economic incentives of FIT policies of seven representa-
tive provinces from 2011 to 2016 by calculating NPV/IRR values.
We reveal the facts that the policy incentives were increasing in
the past 6 years and the quota instrument failed to control the
actual installations in the past 3 years. A system dynamics
approach is adopted to explain the mechanism behind these two
facts. It incorporates economic approach and technology learning
curve to show the dynamic interactions between FIT policies
(tariff and quota) and other import factors such as NPV/IRR values,
PV technology progress, PV waste and cumulative installation.
Finally, our analysis shows that in the near term the central
authority should adjust the tariff levels of three FIT regions more
frequently to keep IRR values in the range of 8–12%, and a tight
quota combined with the deployment of ultra-high voltage
(UHV) lines should be continued for the provinces with severe
PV waste.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a thorough
literature review. Section 3 introduces the FIT policies in China.
Section 4 describes the methods and data collection. Section 5
shows the historical NPV/IRR values and dynamic mechanism of
the FIT system. The last section gives conclusions.
2. Literature review
Worldwide, FIT policies have been the most implemented
policy to stimulate the deployment of PV technology [13]. The
FIT policies guarantee fixed prices and long contractual periods,
which lowers the perceived risks for investors. Compared with
other policy mechanisms such as renewable portfolio standard
(PRS), FIT policies are more efficient to increase the capacity and
stimulate R&D input to reduce costs [14]. However, FIT policies
may inhibit a healthy market competition by giving preferential
treatment to certain technologies and increase financial burden
on taxpayers [15].In previous studies, Hoppmann et al. [16] investigated the evo-
lution of Germany’s FIT policies and shown how the characteristics
of socio-technical systems affect policy interventions. Gao et al.
[17] developed a step-by-step guidance for late and prospective
FIT comers to fine-tune their scheme. For the evaluation of the
FIT policies, the economic approaches had been widely adopted.
For example, Jenner et al. [18] used economic approaches to assess
the success of the FIT policies in 26 European Union countries.
Callego-Castillo et al. [19] investigated the effects of FIT policies
on wholesale electricity markets and the effects of FIT policies in
increasing taxpayer’s burden. Ahmad et al. [20] and Shahmoham-
madi et al. [21] used system dynamics approach to evaluate the
impacts of FIT policies on solar PV investments and the generation
mix in Malaysia. Also the tool of learning curve is usually adopted
to represent the technology progress which is a key component in
the optimal FIT models [22,23].
Focusing on the PV development in China specifically, Huang
et al. [7] presented an overview of how China became a world lea-
der in solar PV. Kayser [24] pointed out the risk factors that inhibit
demand-driven PV market development. Hui et al. [25] identified
that high generation costs and inadequate grid transmission capac-
ity impede the development of clean generation technologies.
Zhang et al. [26] proposed a real option model for evaluating PV
investment under uncertainty. For the FIT policies specifically,
Ouyang et al. [27] calculated the levelized cost of electricity of solar
PV for the year of 2011 and compared with corresponding feed-in
tariffs. Wang et al. [28] studied the effects of FIT policies on China’s
upstream and downstream PV firms. Lin et al. [29] demonstrated a
method to combine FIT policies with emissions trading scheme for
a cost-effective climate policy package. Li et al. [30] calculated the
annual return on investment and payback period of integrated PV
greenhouses systems. Rodrigues et al. [31] calculated the NPV, IRR
and payback period of residential PV systems for the year of 2015.
However, to our best knowledge so far no one has calculated a ser-
ies of historical NPV/IRR values of different areas in China for cen-
tralized PV system and investigated the dynamic mechanism of FIT
system. In this paper, we assess the strength of FIT policies of seven
representative provinces from 2011 to 2016 by calculating NPV/
IRR values. Moreover, a system dynamics approach incorporating
economic approach and technology learning curve is used to show
the dynamic interactions of between FIT policies (tariff and quota)
and other factors such as investment profits, technology progress
and PV waste.3. The PV FIT system in China
Usually, the elements of FIT policies include: tariff levels, the
degression mechanism of tariffs, contract duration and (soft or
hard) cap. Compared with the major FIT countries in Europe such
as Germany, Spain and Italy, there are several differences in China.
As China is a huge country and the distribution of solar resource is
highly uneven, the central authority set three FIT regions where
areas with higher irradiations will get lower tariff levels. There is
no automatic degressionmechanism in China and the period of tar-
iff adjustment, almost 30 months, is much longer than other coun-
tries. Also the quota instrument in China is different from the hard
cap in other major FIT countries (see the detailed analysis in the
results section).3.1. Tariff levels
In July 2011, the National Development and Reform Commis-
sion (NDRC) announced a nationwide FIT policy for the develop-
ment of solar PV. It stated that (1) non-bidding projects approved
before 1-7-2011 and starting with operation before 31-12-2011
Fig. 1. Annual new installation of centralized and distributed PV systems in China [11,12,9].
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after 1-7-2011 or approved before 1-7-2011 but starting with oper-
ation after 31-12-2011 will get a tariff of 1 CNY/kW h [32]. In Aug.
2013, the NDRC issued the ‘‘Notice on the role of price lever in pro-
moting the healthy development of the PV industry” [33]. PV power
generation was categorized into either distributed or centralized
systems. Concerning centralized power generation, the whole coun-
try was further divided into three regions, based on solar resource
distribution (see Fig. 2. Tibet is an exception, not included in FIT
regions.). The tariff were set at 0.9, 0.95 and 1.00 CNY/kW h for
Region I, II and III respectively, for projects approved after 1-9-
2013 or projects approved before 1-9-2013 but in operation after
1-1-2014. Particularly, it stated that in principle the feed-in tariffs
will be guaranteed for 20 years. In Dec. 2015, the updated policy
was issued, the ‘‘Notice on Perfection of Policy Regarding Feed-in
Tariff of Power Generated by Off-Shore Wind and Solar PV” [34],
which reduced the tariff levels to 0.80, 0.88 and 0.98 CNY/kW h for
Region I, II and III respectively, for projects approved after
1-1-2016 or projects approved before 1-1-2016, but in operation
after 30-6-2016. The tariffs are actually paid by the industrial and
commercial users by adding renewable surcharge into the electricity
price. Currently, the renewable surcharge is 0.019 CNY/kW h [35].2 The central authority sponsored the top runner plan in 2016 which made a
concrete indexes for module, inverter and other PV components [41]. For example, it
stipulated that the conversion efficiency of monocrystalline and polycrystalline3.2. Installation quota
In 2013, there was an explosive growth of new installation.
These new projects were mainly installed in western China such
as Xinjiang, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai and Ningxia where
the ability to absorb renewable energy is limited and they are far
away from the load centers of the eastern and central China. In
order to curb the crazy installation, contain policy cost and control
the potential waste of PV electricity, in Aug. 2013, the National
Energy Administration (NEA) introduced installation quota (or
caps) [36]. From 2014 onward, the NEA set installation quotas for
each province [37–40]. Whereas in 2014 the NEA specified quotas
for distributed and centralized systems, from 2015 onward the
NEA only issued total quotas for each province, the latter being free
to split that quota between distributed and centralized systems.
Usually, these quotas should be realized within one year. The
new installation above the quota will not be supported by feed-
in tariffs anymore. Such instrument also appeared in other major1 Exchange rate: 7.30 CNY/EURO, 6.89 CNY/USD, in Nov. 2016.FIT countries such as Germany, Spain and Italy, after they experi-
enced dramatic growth in PV from 2007 to 2008 [17].
3.3. Tendering
In June 2016, the NEA issued installation quotas for eight PV
leading technology bases. They are specialized industry parks
located in the provinces of Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Anhui
and Shandong, with a total capacity of 5.5 GW [40]. According to
the legislation, these quotas must be allocated to projects by ten-
dering, and only the most competitive enterprises were eligible
to participate the bidding. Moreover, the main products such as
modules, inverters, and so forth, should be purchased preferen-
tially from manufactures identified as the ‘‘top runner”.2 The ten-
dering scheme can stimulate PV technology innovation and avoid
that uncompetitive enterprises survive financially depending on
government policies. Moreover, it provides a way of soliciting prices
from a wider array of developers. The bidding prices can be used as a
guide to set reasonable tariff levels. A similar trend from FIT policies
to tendering has happened in other countries such as Australia [17].
4. Methods and data
Three tools are used in this paper: NPV/IRR, learning curve and
system dynamics. NPV/IRR is used to show the economic incen-
tives of FIT policies. Learning curve is used to derive the learning
rate of centralized PV power systems and to predict the system
prices of 2015 and 2016 which are the inputs to calculate
NPV/IRR values of 2015 and 2016. The system dynamics approach
incorporating NPV/IRR and learning curve is adopted to conceptu-
ally show the dynamic mechanism of the FIT system.
4.1. Economic framework
The economic analysis of supported tariff levels is performed by
calculating the NPV and IRR of the investment. NPV is the sum
across all future years of the difference between revenues andmodules should be more than 17% and 16.5% respectively. There is no extra subsidies
for enterprises that are identified as top runner, but it can improve enterprises’ brand
value.
Fig. 2. Three FIT regions and the UHV lines (gray line is in operation, red lines are under construction). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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discount rate that makes NPV zero. They are both measures of
the expected profitability of an investment decision, the former
is extensive/absolute and the latter intensive/relative. They are
defined as follows (notice that IRR is defined implicitly):
NPV ¼ SP þ
XT
t¼1
ðEt  pt  O&Mt  TAXtÞ=ð1þ rÞt ð1Þ
0 ¼ SP þ
XT
t¼1
ðEt  pt  O&Mt  TAXtÞ=ð1þ IRRÞt ð2Þ
In the previous expressions T (year) is the lifetime of a PV
system; SP (CNY/kW) is the system price or installation cost
(the sum of permit fee, overheads, module, inverter, control sys-
tem, rack, wire and other components); E (kW h/kW) is the annual
PV electricity output; p (CNY/kW h) is the feed-in tariff or electric-
ity price; O&M (CNY/kW h) are the operation and maintenance
costs; TAX (CNY/kW h) are the taxes including value added tax
(VAT) and income tax; r is the discount rate.
We make the following assumptions:
 The lifetime is assumed to be 25 years [27].
 The annual PV electricity output is mainly determined by the
irradiation hit on the tilted angle plane annually (I, kW h/m2),
the performance ratio (PR),3 the system degradation factor
(DF).4 We assume that PR ¼ 0:81 and DF ¼ 0:993 [42], and assume
that the PV systems are fixed-axis systems. Annual PV electricity
output is calculated as Et ¼ I ½kWh=m2=1 ½kW=m2 1 ½kW PR DFt . 53 The performance ratio is the ratio of the actual energy production connected to
the grid to theoretical energy production.
4 System degradation factor is the percentage of initial capacity that is still
functional in year t.
5 The PV energy production per kWp equals peak sunshine hours multiplied by
actual capacity, and the peak sunshine hours equal to I [kW h/m2]/1 [kW/m2] = I h, as
peak power of PV module is tested under a constant irradiation of 1 kW h/m2. The discount rate is assumed to be 6% [42].6
 Operation and maintenance costs change over time. We assume
that in the first 5 years O&M are 0:2% of the system price, in
subsequent 7 years they become 0:5%, and beyond that date
they rise to 1% [27].
 Taxes include: value added tax (VAT) (with a rate of 17%);
income tax (with a rate of 25%). PV generators enjoy several
tax reductions: 50% reduction in VAT; income tax exemption
in the first three years; and 50% reduction in the subsequent
three years [27]. For simplicity we assume that in the first
6 years generators do not pay any VAT, as the VAT which was
paid at the time of purchasing the equipments for initial
installation can be deducted in the coming years.
 All the electricity produced by PV power generations will be
purchased by the grid company.
4.2. Learning curve
A learning (or experience) curve [43] expresses the cost reduc-
tion of a technology as a function of cumulative production or
installed capacity, which is used as a proxy for the accumulated
experience gained through learning-by-doing. The equation of a
learning curve is written as:
Ct ¼ k  CUMat ð3Þ
where CUM is cumulative production or installed capacity of the
technology, C is the unit cost of the production or of the installed
equipment, and both k and a are parameters. This formulation
implies that for each doubling of cumulative production or installa-
tion the unit cost drops by the percentage 1 2a, called the learning
rate. The learning curve is a simple but powerful tool to model
technological progress and to inform policy decision [44,45,43].6 It is a little above the current five-year loan interest rate 5.4%.
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Germany and 20% worldwide.4.3. System dynamics
System dynamics (SD) is a conceptual tool developed in the
1950s by Forrester [47]. In this methodology, the dynamic beha-
viour of the system is assumed to be a result of interconnected
web of feedback loops. Feedback loops represent connections
between variables with causal links. They are of two types: positive
(also known as reinforcing) and negative (also known as balanc-
ing). Positive feedback loops enhance or amplify the feedback of
information. Negative feedback loops are goal seeking and tend
to resist change in the system. This approach is used to analyze
energy policies [7,16].
In the FIT system, the tariff levels, installation quotas, new
installations, technology progress, NPV/IRR values, policy cost,
the waste of PV electricity, government attitudes and other com-
ponents nexus form a complex system. Based on experts’
reviews, study of import regulations, analysis of historical data,
calculation of NPV/IRR values and derivation of learning rate of
PV system, we establish the causal loop diagrams as shown in
Fig. 6.4.4. Data collection
We choose Xinjiang, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Hebei and
Jiangsu as seven representative provinces, as the new installation
in these seven provinces accounted for 94.5%, 80% and 69% of
national new installation in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively.
Fig. 2 shows the locations of these provinces on the map. Installa-
tions and quotas of seven representative provinces are shown in
Fig. 4. Fig. A.8 shows the distribution of irradiations of these pro-
vinces (note that some provinces have counties belonging to differ-
ent FIT regions). The national average system prices (i.e., the
installation cost of PV), from 2011 to 2016, are shown in
Table A.1 (the system prices of 2015 and 2016 are estimated using
learning curves). The system prices for seven representative pro-
vinces in 2013 and 2014 are shown in Table A.2.7 As the system
prices of seven provinces in years of 2011, 2012, 2015 and 2016
are unknown, we assume the system price of each province in those
years to be equal to the national average price. The purchase prices
of PV electricity during the first 20 years of its life time (or feed-in
tariffs) are provided in Table A.3, split by geographical region. In
the last 5 years of its life time the purchase prices are the same as
that of coal-fired electricity, shown in Table A.4. Note that the start
date of new tariffs are 1-7-2011, 1-1-2014 and 1-7-2016 respec-
tively. We assume the tariff is 1.15 CNY/kW h in 2011, as most pro-
jects were installed before 1-7-2011 to obtain the higher tariff. In
2016, actually a part of the projects was supported by the old tariffs.
However, for the purpose of simplicity we assume the new tariffs as
the tariffs for all in 2016. We also assume that in the future the
prices of coal-fired electricity are the same as the prics in 2015.5. Results
We start by showing two facts: the increasing NPV/IRR values
and the failure of quota instrument. Then we investigate the
underlying mechanism behind these two facts. Finally we answer7 Note that in 2013 and 2014 all provinces’ system prices were within a 6.3% range
of the average except Gansu, which was respectively 9.22% and 17.72% higher, and
Jiangsu, which were 15.64% and 9.49% lower. The lower system prices of Jiangsu are
attributed to its developed PV industry, and the higher system prices of Gansu in 2013
and 2014 may be caused by its dramatic increase in installation.the question how should FIT policies adapt in the near term, and
discuss the challenges in the medium and long term.5.1. Two facts
Setting the right tariff levels is a real challenge. Higher NPV/IRR
levels attract a wider range of investors but may result in finan-
cially less efficient projects and increasing policy cost. While con-
servative NPV/IRR levels may not be sufficient for market
expansion and limit the scope of technology only to those who
operate very efficiently [23]. Fig. 3 shows the NPV/IRR values of
seven representative provinces from 2011 to 2016. As we can
see, in the initial year the NPV values are below zero for most
places, which implies the tariff level was insufficient.8 In the past
6 years, the central authority adjusted the tariff levels three times
(with the start dates of new tariffs at 1-7-2011, 1-1-2014 and 1-7-
2016 respectively, see Table A.3). Every adjustment inhibited the
rapid growth of NPV/IRR values. However, in 2013 and 2015 when
tariff levels were unchanged, the NPV/IRR values increased rapidly.
In 2016 the NPV values of the five western provinces (except Qing-
hai) were slightly declined, but the IRR values were continued to
grow.
Stimulated by the growth of NPV/IRR values, the PV domestic
market expanded dramatically, as shown in Fig. 4 and 5. In 2014,
the quota instrument was introduced to control the explosive
growth of installation in the five western provinces and to obtain
an balanced distribution of installation over the western, central
and eastern China. However, by observing Fig. 5 we find that the
quotas and actual new installations were inconsistent. The new
installation in the five western provinces were almost twice more
than the quota in 2014, which forced the central government to
greatly improve the quota in 2015. Although no quota was allo-
cated to Xinjiang and Gansu in 2016, there were about 3.3 GW
and 0.7 GW installed in Xiangjiang and Gansu respectively. All
these imply that the quota instrument cannot control the new
installation effectively. The uncontrolled installation in the five
western provinces made the PV waste in this area getting increas-
ingly severer (see PV waste rate in five western provinces in
Table A.5).5.2. The mechanism of FIT
Fig. 6 shows the dynamic interactions of different factors in the
FIT system. By this systemic view, we seek to explain the increas-
ing of NPV/IRR values and the forces that make local government
can ignore the quotas set by the central government. The
NPV/IRR values are determined by tariff level, system price (i.e.
installation cost) and resource endowment (solar irradiation).
Higher NPV/IRR values trigger installation expansion which leads
to learning effect or learning-by-doing (LBD) which means the sys-
tem price declines by a constant percentage with each doubling of
cumulative installation. Learning effect is an important factor in
triggering technological progress [45]. As shown in Fig. 7, for cen-
tralized PV power system in China we find that the learning rate is
16.5%, this is, the national system price will decrease at a rate of
16.5% when cumulative installation doubles. If tariff levels keep
unchanged, the NPV/IRR values will rise dramatically as a result
of the falling system price (see what happed in 2013 and 2015 in
Fig. 3). Hence the central authority has to reduce the tariff level
periodically to keep NPV/IRR values at a reasonable range. Observ-
ing Fig. 5 and NPV/IRR values of Hebei and Jiangsu in Fig. 3 from
2011 to 2015, although the central authority issued more and more8 With negative NPV values there were still 2 GW installed in 2011, which is mainly
because investors were eager to buy tickets to enter this new field.
Fig. 4. The installations and quotas of seven representative provinces, from 2012 to 2016 [9,11,37–40]. Number sequence ‘‘2 3 4 5 6” represents the years of ‘‘2012 2013 2014
2015 2016”. Red points are quotas and black points are installations. Note that the installation in 2012 is the cumulative installation, others are new installations. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 3. The NPV/IRR levels of seven representative provinces, from 2011 to 2016. It shows the maximum value and 75% percentile value as most installations located in sites
with high NPV/IRR values. Number sequence ‘‘1 2 3 4 5 6” represents the years of ‘‘2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016”.
L.-C. Ye et al. / Applied Energy 203 (2017) 496–505 501
Fig. 5. The total installation and quota nationwide and in the western provinces respectively. ‘N’ represents national and ‘W’ represents the five western provinces.
Fig. 6. Dynamic interactions between FIT policies and other factors. The cycled elements are the emphasized elements.
























Fig. 7. Learning curve for centralized PV system in China with learning rate
16:5%; R2 ¼ 0:994.
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insufficient to stimulate installations in this area. The increasing of
NPV/IRR values in the past 6 years was mainly due to (i) the reduc-
tion of tariff levels did not catch up with the falling system prices,
as the uncertain nature of technological progress and very limitedcumulative data in early years; (ii) the central authority wanted to
provide a higher NPV/IRR to further stimulate the expansion of
domestic PV market, particularly in the central and eastern China.
In the years of 2012 and 2013, almost all installations located in
the five western provinces as higher NPV/IRR values than other
areas. However, as the less load demand and the absence of
long-distance transmission lines to connect to the central and east-
ern China, the waste of PV electricity in these five provinces
became the most concerned problem (see PV waste rate in
Table A.5). It compelled the central government to introduce the
quota instrument to curb the crazy installation and the severe PV
waste in the five western provinces. A project without quota will
not get any feed-in tariff. At the same time, the central authority
greatly slashed tariff levels in Region I and Region II (see
Table A.3), but the five western provinces still had higher
NPV/IRR values than provinces in the central and eastern China
(see Fig. 3). Although the quota is set by the central government,
the local governments are the ones to approve projects and allo-
cate the quota. To attract more investments for the purpose of
GDP growth, local governments usually approved more projects
than their provincial quota. Moreover, they allocated the quota
on a first installed first served basis, which forced developers to
L.-C. Ye et al. / Applied Energy 203 (2017) 496–505 503construct generations quickly to grab the limited quota. For those
failed to obtain quota, they can wait in line for the next year’s
quota. Hence the quota instrument is not a hard cap. It only affects
the developers’ cash flow and extends the payback year. It seems
that the high NPV/IRR values in the five western provinces made
project developers willing to take the risk of PV waste and the loss
caused by (temporarily) missing the quota. Another factor that
greatly impacts the FIT policies is UHV (ultra-high voltage) trans-
mission lines. Currently, one UHV lines is into operation and eight
UHV lines are under construction (see Fig. 2) for the development
of renewable energy [48]. For example, the Jiuquan (Gansu) –
Hunan transmission line is a 800 kV HVDC with a transmission
capacity of 8 GW over a distance of 2413 km. It will be in operation
in 2017. It is expected that when these UHV lines connect to the
load centers, the problem of PV waste in five western provinces
will be greatly solved, and a large amount of quota will be issued
to them to fully exploit the UHV lines. That is the reason why
Gansu and Xinjiang installed 0.74 GW and 3.3 GW in 2016 respec-
tively, totally ignoring their zero quotas and severe PV waste rates,
30.45% and 32.23% in 2016 respectively.
5.3. The FIT in the near future
In this subsection, we mainly attempt to answer two questions,
how to adjust the tariff levels, and how to set the quota in the near
term. Firstly, in the past 6 years the period of tariff adjustment is
quite long, almost 30 months, which led to the rapid increase of
NPV/IRR values in the year of 2013 and 2015 when tariff levels
were unchanged while system price was falling. Hence a more fre-
quent adjustment of tariff levels, at least once every year, should be
adopted. Secondly, what is an appropriate NPV/IRR value? As
shown in Fig. 4, a sudden installation growth was happened in
the five western provinces in 2013 (except Qinghai9), and in Hebei
in 2014, while the corresponding IRR values were approximately in a
range of 8% – 12%. Although Jiangsu is a special province with its
own province-level feed-in tariffs,10 the NPV/IRR values of Jiangsu
can represent the eastern provinces and some central provinces. In
2016, for the first time, the installation in the central and eastern
China suddenly surpassed that in the five western provinces (see
Fig. 5), while the corresponding IRR values were approximately in
a range of 10–11% (IRR values of Jiangsu). Hence we believe that
the IRR values of 8–12% are reasonable and sufficient to stimulate
the installation expansion. The central authority should adjust fre-
quently the tariff levels of three regions to keep IRR values in the
range of 8–12%. It implies the current NPV/IRR values in the five
western provinces are quite high and there is a large room to cut
down the current tariff levels in Region I and Region II.
In the near term, a tight quota for the five western provinces is
necessary. Although it did not effectively control the installation,
without quota the situation will be even worse (see Fig. 4 the crazy
installations in 2013 when no quota was set). Moreover, with the9 In May 2011, prior to the time of national FIT, Qinghai announced its provincia
FIT that projects into operation before 30-9-2011 can obtain a tariff of 1.15 CNY/kW h
Such a strategy attracted the investments from the whole country and led to abou
1 GW installation in 2011 and 2012 respectively. The province-level tariff of Qingha
was stopped when the central authority announced national FIT policy.
10 Jiangsu is the only province in China who implements the province-level tariff. I
started its provincial tariff in 2009, with 2.15 CNY/kW h, 1.7 CNY/kW h and 1.4 CNY
kW h feed-in triffs for centralized power generation in 2009, 2010 and 2011
respectively [49]. In 2012, it continued to provide 1.3 CNY/kW h, 1.25 CNY/kW h
1.2 CNY/kW h and 1.15 CNY/kW h feed-in tariffs for new installations in 2012, 2013
2014 and 2015 respectively [50]. This explains why a province with poor solar
resource and lower NPV/IRR values still has a huge amount of PV power installed
Compared to national 20-year feed-in tariff, the duration of Jiangsu’s tariff is unclear












reasonable IRR values, 8–12%, the thrilling effect of quota will be
amplified, and both local government and project developers will
be more cautious. Ofcourse, the setting of quota should be associ-
ated with the process of UHV lines deployment. Once a UHV line is
constructed, more quotas should be issued for the corresponding
provinces. In the 13th national plan (2016–2020) [48], volume tar-
get of at least 62 GW was set. Interestingly, only in 2016 34.54 GW
(30.31 GW centralized power generations, 4.23 GW distributed
systems) was realized [9]. We argue that such installation speed
will continue in the coming years as currently the PV electricity
only account for 1% of total electricity production [9], and the sta-
tus of PV waste in the western area will be greatly changed when
several UHV lines in operation in 2017, 2018 and 2019. Although
the increasing of installation volume will inevitably increases the
policy cost which is finally burden by industrial and commercial
users, there is still a room for the renewable surcharge as currently
the surcharge is only 0.019 CNY/kW h [35].5.4. Discussion
In this paper, the system dynamics approach is used to study
the interactions between different factors. It incorporates eco-
nomic approach and technology learning, quantifying the relation-
ship between NPV/IRR, system price, tariff levels and resource
endowment and the relationship between system price and
national cumulative installation. However, not every relationship
is quantified in Fig. 6. For example, we cannot calculate the actual
profits affected by the limited quota and the risk of PV waste
because of insufficient data. And the setting of tariff levels is also
affected by the national target, or the ambition of the central
authority, which cannot be measured. However, this approach
does give us an insight into the mechanism of FIT system. The PV
waste is mainly due to (i) lack of long-distance (2000–5000 km)
transmission lines to connect solar resource centers to load
demand centers; (ii) the conflict with conventional non-flexibility
generations. In the near future, the PV waste caused by the absence
of transmission lines will be greatly solved by the deployment of
UHV lines. However, with penetration of PV electricity and highly
variability of weather-based energy, the conflict with conventional
generations will become increasingly severe. Hence in the medium
and long term, in order to promote the development of PV technol-
ogy we should go beyond the FIT policies. It is essential to improve
the grid’s system-wide flexibilities to accommodate a high level of
weather-based renewable energy [51]. A free electricity market to
motivate generators to provide flexibility services will also be a key
in this energy transition. Currently, the central authority is trying
to promote the reform of electricity market, direct power-
purchase for large users, to replace the market of fixed prices set
by the government [52]. Finally, a very important question is when
the PV electricity will be competitive. Based on our economic
framework, to meet 0.36–0.40 CNY/kW h the system prices should
be driven down to 5300–5900 CNY/kW,11 which requires about
190–290 GW cumulative installation by the learning rate of 16.5%.
That means there is still a long way to go before we achieve grid par-
ity of generation side.6. Conclusions
The FIT policies have successfully stimulated PV domestic mar-
ket. In 2016 the new installation has reached 33 GW accounting for
about 40% of world new installation. However, there are some side11 The Eq. (1) is used to calculate system price by setting NPV ¼ 0; p ¼ 0:36ð0:40
[27,42].Þ
Table A.2
System prices of seven representative provinces in 2013 and 2014, in unit of










Tariff levels of 3-region from 2011 to 2016 (include VAT), in units of CNY/kW h. Note
that the start date of new tariffs are 1-7-2011, 1-1-2014 and 1-7-2016 respectively.
We assume the tariff is 1.15 CNY/kW h in 2011, as most projects were installed before
1-7-2011 to obtain the higher tariff. In 2016, actually a part of projects supported by
the old tariffs.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Region I 1.15 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.80
Region II 1.15 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.88
Region III 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98
504 L.-C. Ye et al. / Applied Energy 203 (2017) 496–505effects accompanied with PV expansion such as PV waste. In the
past six years the central authority was updating FIT policies by
setting three FIT regions, reducing tariff levels and introducing
quota instrument to promote sustainable development of solar PV.
In this paper, we have shown the historical NPV/IRR values of
seven representative provinces in the past six years, studied the
dynamic mechanism of FIT system, and evaluated the performance
of FIT policies (tariff and quota). We have revealed that the NPV/
IRR values supported by feed-in tariffs were increasing in the past
six years, and that the quota instrument failed to control the actual
installation. In the near term, the central authority should adjust
the tariff levels more frequently, at least once every year, to keep
the IRR values in the range of 8–12%. Although the quota instru-
ment failed to control the installation, a tight quota combined with
the deployment of UHV lines should be continued for provinces of
severe PV waste.
As pointed in Section 5.4, in order to promote renewable energy
development we should go beyond the FIT policies. In the medium
and long term, the variability of weather-based renewables will be
the key factor in energy transition. The impact of variable renew-
able energies on the grid system and the flexibility requirement
in balancing the supply and demand to cope with high penetration
renewables will be our future research topics.Table A.4
Prices of coal-fired electricity in 2015 (include VAT), in units of CNY/kWh [35].
Xinjiang Gansu Inner Mongolia Qinghai Ningxia Hebei Jiangsu
0.2620 0.2978 0.2772 0.3247 0.2595 0.3497 0.3780Appendix A






Inner Mongolia, Region I







Fig. A.8. The distribution of annual irradiation of Jiangsu, Region III (65 counties), Hebei, Region III (37 counties), Hebei, Region II (104 counties), Ningxia, Region I (18
counties), Qinghai, Region II (35 counties), Qinghai, Region I (5 counties), Inner Mongolia, Region II (37 counties), Inner Mongolia, Region I (54 counties), Gansu, Region II (54
counties), Gansu, Region I (19 counties), Xinjiang, Region II (78 counties), Xinjiang, Region I (21 counties). Note that the figure shows the irradiation hit on an inclined panel at
the optimal angle instead of an horizontal surface. Data are collected from www.pvtrade.cn.
Table A.1
Installations and system prices of centralized PV system [11,53,54].
Time 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
New installation (MW) 108 283 2000 1800 10,638 8550 13,410 30,310
Cumulative installation (MW) 109 392 2392 4192 14,830 23,380 36,790 67,100
System price (CNY/kW h) 35,000 25,000 17,500 14,788 12,214 10,243 – –
System price (2015 CNY/kW h) 42,780 28,720 18,650 15,030 12,140 10,200 9070⁄⁄ 7775⁄⁄
⁄⁄ The values estimated using learning curve.
Table A.5
The waste rate of PV electricity [55,56]. Usually the waste rate should be controlled
below 5%.
Xinjiang Gansu Inner Mongolia Qinghai Ningxia
2015 26% 31% – 3% 7%
2016 32.23% 30.45% – 8.33% 7.15%
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